We propose a hybrid probabilistic process calculus for modelling and reasoning on cyber-physical systems (CPSs). The dynamics of the calculus is expressed in terms of a probabilistic labelled transition system in the SOS style of Plotkin. This is used to define a bisimulation-based probabilistic behavioural semantics which supports compositional reasonings. For a more careful comparison between CPSs, we provide two compositional probabilistic metrics to formalise the notion of behavioural distance between systems, also in the case of bounded computations. Finally, we provide a non-trivial case study, taken from an engineering application, and use it to illustrate our definitions and our compositional behavioural theory for CPSs. * A preliminary version appeared in the proceedings of LATA 2017, LNCS 10168, pp. 115-127, Springer [30]. 1 We refer to [45] for a tassonomy of time-scale models used to represent CPSs.
Introduction
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are integrations of networking and distributed computing systems with physical processes, where feedback loops allow physical processes to affect computations and vice versa. CPSs can be considered as an evolution of embedded systems, where components are immersed in and interact with the physical world, via physical devices (such as sensors and actuators). They can be also seen as an evolution of networked control systems, where physical processes and controllers interact via a communication system.
The physical plant of a CPS is often represented by means of a discrete-time state-space model 1 consisting of two equations of the form x k+1 = Ax k + Bu k + w k y k = Cx k + e k where x k ∈ R n is the current (physical) state, u k ∈ R m is the input (i.e., the control actions implemented through actuators) and y k ∈ R p is the output (i.e., the measurements obtained from the sensors). The uncertainty w k ∈ R n and the measurement error e k ∈ R p represent perturbation and sensor noise, respectively. The parameters A, B, and C are matrices modelling the dynamics of the physical system. The next state x k+1 depends on the current state x k and the corresponding control actions u k , at the sampling instant k ∈ N. Note that, the state x k cannot be directly observed: only its measurements y k can be observed. The physical plant is supported by a communication network through which the sensor measurements and actuator data are exchanged with the controller(s), i.e., the cyber component, also called logics, of a CPS (see Figure 1 ).
In general terms, CPSs can be considered as both nondeterministic and probabilistic systems. Nondeterminism arises as they consist of distributed networks in which the activities of specific components Figure 1 Structure of a CPS occur nondeterministically, whereas the probabilistic behaviour is due to the presence of the uncertainty in the model and the measurement error, which are usually represented as probability distributions.
The range of CPSs applications is rapidly increasing and already covers several domains [26] : advanced automotive systems, energy conservation, environmental monitoring, avionics, critical infrastructure control (for instance, electric power, water resources, and communications systems), etc.
However, there is still a lack of research on the modelling and validation of CPSs through formal methodologies that might allow to model the interactions among the system components, and to verify the correctness of a CPS, as a whole, before its practical implementation. A straightforward utilisation of these techniques is for model-checking [10] , or even better, for probabilistic model-checking [27] , to statically assess whether the current system deployment can guarantee the expected behaviour. However, they can also be an important aid for system planning, for instance to decide whether different deployments for a given application are behavioural equivalent.
Process calculi have been successfully used to model and analyse concurrent, distributed and mobile systems (see, e.g., the π-calculus [35] , Ambients [8] and the Distributed π-calculus [24] ). However, to better describe systems based on a particular paradigm, dedicated calculi are needed. In this paper, we propose a contribution in the area of formal methods for CPSs, by defining a hybrid probabilistic process calculus, called CCPS, with a clearly-defined behavioural semantics for specifying and reasoning on CPSs. In CCPS, systems are represented as terms of the form E P, where E denotes the physical plant (also called environment) of the system, containing information on state variables, actuators, sensors, evolution law, etc., while P represents the cyber component of the system, i.e., the controller that governs sensor reading and actuator writing, as well as channel-based communication with other cyber components. Thus, channels are used for logical interactions between cyber components, whereas sensors and actuators make possible the interaction between cyber and physical components. Despite this conceptual similarity, messages transmitted via channels are "consumed" upon reception, whereas actuators' states (think of a valve) remains unchanged until its controller modifies it.
CCPS adopts a discrete notion of time [23] and it is equipped with a probabilistic labelled transition semantics (pLTS) in the style of [39] . We prove that our probabilistic labelled transition semantics satisfies some standard time properties such as: time determinism, patience, maximal progress, and well-timedness. Based on our pLTS, we define a natural notion of weak probabilistic bisimilarity, written ≈. As a main result, we prove that our bisimilarity is preserved by appropriate system contexts and it is hence suitable for compositional reasoning. Then, we provide a non-trivial case study, taken from an engineering application, and use it to illustrate our definitions and our compositional behavioural theory for CPSs 2 . We use our case study to show that the probabilistic bisimilarity is only partially satisfactory to reason on CPSs as it can only establish whether two CPSs behave exactly in the same way or not. Any tiny variation of the probabilistic behaviour of one of the two systems under consideration will break the equality without any further information on the "distance" of their behaviours. To this end, bisimulation metric semantics have been successfully employed to formalise the behavioural distance between two systems [18, 17, 41, 13] . Thus, we generalise our probabilistic bisimilarity by providing a notion of weak bisimulation metric for CCPS along the lines of [18] . We will write M ≈ p N, if the weak bisimilarity between M and N holds with a distance p, with p ∈ [0, 1]. Intuitively, ≈ 0 will coincide with the weak probabilistic bisimilarity ≈ (zero distance), whereas ≈ 1 will correspond to the cartesian product CCPS × CCPS (maximum distance). We also provide a notion of n-bisimilarity metric which takes into account bounded computations of systems [17] . This kind of metric, denoted with ≈ n p , for n ∈ N + , says that the distance p of the system under considerations is ensured only for the first n computational steps. Both metrics ≈ p and ≈ n p are proved to be preserved by the same contexts considered for ≈, and hence they reveal to be suitable for compositional reasonings. In particular, they satisfy a well-known compositional property called non-expansiveness [17, 20, 21] . Finally, with the help of our case study, we will show how n-bisimilarity metric can be very helpful in situations where it is not necessary to observe a system "ad infinitum" as it is makes much more sense to observe its behaviour for bounded computations.
Outline. In Section 2, we give syntax and operational semantics of CCPS. In Section 3, we provide a bisimulation-based probabilistic behavioural semantics for CCPS and prove its compositionality. In Section 4, we model our case study in CCPS, and prove for it run-time properties as well as system equalities. In Section 5, we define our bisimulation metrics for CCPS. In Section 6, we revise our case study by providing a more accurate analysis based on our bisimulation metrics. In Section 7, we draw conclusions and discuss related and future work.
The calculus
In this section, we introduce our Calculus of Cyber-Physical Systems CCPS. Let us start with some preliminary notations. We use x, x k ∈ X for state variables (associated to physical states of systems), c, d ∈ C for communication channels, a, a k ∈ A for actuator devices, s, s k ∈ S for sensors devices. Actuator names are metavariables for actuator devices like valve, light, etc. Similarly, sensor names are metavariables for sensor devices, e.g., a sensor thermometer that measures, with a given precision, a state variable called temperature. Values, ranged over by v, v ∈ V , are built from basic values, such as Booleans, integers and real numbers; they also include names.
Given a generic set of names N , we write R N to denote the set of functions assigning a real value to each name in N . For ξ ∈ R N , n ∈ N and v ∈ R, we write ξ [n → v] to denote the function ψ ∈ R N such that ψ(m) = ξ (m), for any m = n, and ψ(n) = v. Given ξ 1 ∈ R N 1 and ξ 2 ∈ R N 2 such that
Finally, given ξ ∈ R N and a set of names M ⊆ N , we write ξ | M for the restriction of function ξ to the set M . Definition 1 (Cyber-physical system). In CCPS, a cyber-physical system consists of two components:
• a physical environment E that encloses all physical aspects of a system (state variables, physical devices, evolution law, etc) and • a cyber component, represented as a concurrent process P that interacts with the physical devices (sensors and actuators) of the system, and can communicate, via channels, with other processes of the same CPS or with processes of other CPSs.
We write E P to denote the resulting CPS, and use M and N to range over CPSs.
As CCPS is a probabilistic calculus, we report the necessary mathematical machinery for its formal definition.
Definition 2 (Distribution). A (discrete) probability sub-distribution over a generic set S is a function δ : S → [0, 1] with ∑ s∈S δ (s) ∈ (0, 1]. We write |δ | as an abbreviation for ∑ s∈S δ (s). The support of a probability sub-distribution δ is given by supp(δ ) = {s ∈ S : δ (s) > 0}. We write D sub (S), ranged over γ, δ and ε, for the set of all probability sub-distributions over S with finite support. A probability subdistribution δ ∈ D sub (S) is said to be a probability distribution if ∑ s∈S δ (s) = 1. With D(S) we denote the set of all probability distributions over S with finite support. For any s ∈ S, the point (Dirac) distribution at s, denoted s, assigns probability 1 to s and 0 to all others elements of S, so that supp(s) = {s}.
Let I be a finite indexing set such that (i) δ i is a sub-distribution in D sub (S) for each i ∈ I, and (ii) p i ≥ 0 are probabilities such that ∑ i∈I p i ∈ (0, 1]. The probability sub-distribution (or convex combination) ∑ i∈I p i · δ i is the sub-distribution defined by (∑ i∈I p i · δ i )(s) = ∑ i∈I p i δ i (s) for all s ∈ S. We write a sub-distribution as p 1 · δ 1 + . . . + p n · δ n when the indexing set I is {1, . . . , n}.
In the rest of the paper, symbol ε ranges over distributions over physical environments, π ranges over distributions over processes and γ ranges over distributions over CPSs.
In Definition 1, we said that a CPS consists of two (interacting) components: physical environment and logics. Let us formally define physical environments.
Definition 3 (Physical environment). LetX ⊆ X be a set of state variables,Â ⊆ A be a set of actuators, andŜ ⊆ S be a set of sensors. A physical environment E is 7-tuple ξ x , ξ u , ξ w , evol, ξ e , meas, inv , where:
• ξ e ∈ RŜ is the sensor-error function,
All the functions defining an environment are total functions.
The state function ξ x returns the current value (in R) associated to each state variable of the system. The actuator function ξ u returns the current value associated to each actuator. The uncertainty function ξ w returns the uncertainty associated to each state variable. Thus, given a state variable x ∈X , ξ w (x) returns the maximum distance between the real value of x and its representation in the model. Both the state function and the actuator function are supposed to change during the evolution of the system, whereas the uncertainty function is supposed to be constant.
Given a state function, an actuator function, and an uncertainty function, the evolution map evol returns a probability distribution over state functions. This function models the evolution law of the physical system, where changes made on actuators may reflect on state variables. Since we assume an uncertainty in our models, the evolution map does not return a single state function but a probability distribution.
The sensor-error function ξ e returns the maximum error associated to each sensor inŜ . Again due to the presence of the sensor-error function, the measurement map meas, given the current state function, returns a probability distribution over measurement functions rather than a single measurement function.
Finally, the invariant function inv represents the conditions that the state variables must satisfy to allow for the evolution of the system. A CPS whose state variables do not satisfy the invariant is in deadlock.
In the following, we use a specific notation for the replacement of a single component of an environment with a new one of the same kind; for instance, for E = ξ x , ξ u , ξ w , evol, ξ e , meas, inv , we write E[ξ x ← ξ x ] to denote ξ x , ξ u , ξ w , evol, ξ e , meas, inv .
Let us now formalise the cyber components of CPSs in our calculus CCPS. Our (logical) processes build on the timed process algebra TPL [23] (basically CCS enriched with a discrete notion of time). We extend TPL with two constructs: one to read values detected at sensors, and one to write values on actuators. The remaining processes of the calculus are the same as those of TPL. Definition 4 (Processes). Processes are defined by the grammar:
We write nil for the terminated process. The process idle.P sleeps for one time unit and then continues as P. We write P Q to denote the parallel composition of concurrent processes P and Q. The process chn.P Q, with chn ∈ {snd c v , rcv c(x)}, denotes channel transmission with timeout. Thus, snd c v .P Q sends the value v on channel c and, after that, it continues as P; otherwise, if no communication partner is available within one time unit, it evolves into Q. The process rcv c(x).P Q is the obvious counterpart for channel reception.
Processes of the form phy.P denote activities on physical devices (sensors or actuators). Thus, the construct read s(x).P reads the value v detected by the sensor s and, after that, it continues as P, where x is replaced by v. The process write a v .P writes the value v on the actuator a and then it continues as P.
The process P\c is the channel restriction operator of CCS. It is quantified over the set C of communication channels but we often use the shorthand P\ C to mean P\c 1 \c 2 · · · \c n , for C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n }. In processes of the form idle.Q and chn.P Q, the occurrence of Q is said to be time-guarded. The process rec X.P denotes time-guarded recursion as all occurrences of the process variable X may only occur time-guarded in P.
In the two constructs rcv c(x).P Q and read s(x).P, the variable x is said to be bound. Similarly, the process variable X is bound in rec X.P. This gives rise to the standard notions of free/bound (process) variables and α-conversion. We identify processes up to α-conversion (similarly, we identify CPSs up to renaming of state variables, sensor names, and actuator names). A term is closed if it does not contain free (process) variables, and we assume to always work with closed processes: the absence of free variables is preserved at run-time. As further notation, we write T { v / x } for the substitution of the variable x with the value v in any expression T of our language. Similarly, T { P / X } is the substitution of the process variable X with the process P in T .
The syntax of our CPSs is slightly too permissive as a process might use sensors and/or actuators which are not defined in the physical environment. Definition 5 (Well-formedness). Given a process P and an environment E = ξ x , ξ u , ξ w , evol, ξ e , meas, inv , the CPS E P is well-formed if: (i) any sensor mentioned in P is in the domain of the function ξ e ; (ii) any actuator mentioned in P is in the domain of the function ξ u . A sub-distribution γ ∈ D sub (CCPS) is said to be well-formed if its support contains only well-formed CPSs. 
Hereafter, we will always work with well-formed CPSs. As usual in process calculi, we use the symbol ≡ to denote standard structural congruence for timed processes [35, 34] ; its generalisation to CPSs is immediate: Finally, we assume a number of notational conventions. We write Dead to denote a deadlocked CPS which cannot perform any action. This fictitious CPS will be useful when defining behavioural distances between CPSs (see Definition 13) . We write chn.P instead of rec X. chn.P X, when X does not occur in P. We write snd c (resp. rcv c) when channel c is used for pure synchronisation. For k ≥ 0, we write idle k .P as a shorthand for idle.idle. . . . idle.P, where the prefix idle appears k consecutive times. Given M = E P, we write M Q for E (P Q), and M\c for E (P\c).
Probabilistic labelled transition semantics
In this section, we provide the dynamics of CCPS in terms of a probabilistic labelled transition system (pLTS) [39] . First, we give a a pretty standard LTS for processes, then we lift transition rules from processes to CPSs.
In Table 1 , we provide transition rules for processes. Here, the meta-variable λ ranges over labels in the set {idle, τ, cv, cv, a!v, s?(x)}. Rules (Outp), (Inpp) and (Com) serve to model channel communication, on some channel c. Rule (Write) denotes the writing of some data v on an actuator a. Rule (Read) denotes the reading of some physical state via sensor s. Rule (Par) propagates untimed actions over parallel components. Rules (ChnRes) and (Rec) are the standard rules for channel restriction and recursion, respectively. The following four rules are standard, and model the passage of one time unit. The symmetric counterparts of rules (Com) and (Par) are obvious and thus omitted from the table.
In order to define our probabilistic labelled transition semantics for CPSs, we provide some auxiliary 
The operator read sensor(E, s) returns a probability distribution over measurements detected by sensor s in the environment E; due to the error ξ e (s) of sensor s, it returns a probability distribution rather than a single value. update act(E, a, v) returns the new environment in which the actuator function is updated in such a manner to associate the actuator a with the value v. next(E) returns a probability distribution over the next admissible environments reachable from E, by an application of the evolution map. inv(E) checks whether the state variables satisfy the invariant (here, with an abuse of notation, we overload the meaning of the function inv).
In Table 2 , we lift the transition rules from processes to systems, actually to probability distributions overs systems. Here, we adopt the following notation for distributions: given a distribution ε over physical environments and a distribution π over processes, ε π denotes the distribution over CPSs defined by (ε π)(E P) = ε(E) · π(P).
All rules, except (Deadlock), have a common premise inv(E): a CPS can evolve only if the invariant is satisfied, otherwise it is deadlocked. Here, actions, ranged over by α, are in the set Act = {τ, cv, cv, idle}. These actions denote: non-observable activities (τ); observable logical activities, i.e., channel transmission (cv and cv); the passage of time (idle). Rules (Out) and (Inp) model transmission and reception, with an external system, on a channel c. Rule (SensRead) models the reading of the current data detected at sensor s. Rule (ActWrite) models the writing of a value v on an actuator a. Rule (Tau) lifts non-observable actions from processes to systems. A similar lifting occurs in rule (Time) for timed actions, where next(E) returns probability distribution over possible environments for the next time slot. Thus, by an application of rule (Time) a CPS moves to the next physical state, in the next time slot. Rule (Deadlock) is straightforward. Remark 1. Note that the rules in Table 2 define a finitely branching pLTS. This means that for any CPS M there are finitely many distributions reachable from M in one transition step. Moreover, all transitions M α − → γ are such that γ has a finite support. Now, having defined the labelled transitions that can be performed by a CPS, we can easily concatenate these transitions to define the possible computation traces of a system. A computation trace [6] for a CPS E 1 P 1 is a sequence of steps of the form E 1 P 1
Below, we report a few desirable time properties [23] which hold in our calculus: (a) time determinism, (b) maximal progress, (c) patience, and (d) well-timedness. In its standard formulation, time determinism says that a system reaches at most one new state by executing a timed action idle; however, in our setting, this holds only for the logical components (up to structural congruence) whereas the evolution of the physical component is intrinsically probabilistic, due to the presence of uncertainty and measurement errors. The maximal progress property usually says that processes communicate as soon as a possibility of communication arises. In our calculus, we generalise this property saying that instantaneous (silent) actions cannot be delayed. On the other hand, patience says that if no instantaneous actions are possible then time is free to pass. Finally, well-timedness [34, 9] ensures the absence of infinite instantaneous traces which would prevent the passage of time, and hence the physical evolution of a CPS. 
Probabilistic bisimulation
Once defined the labelled transition semantics, we are ready to define our bisimulation-based behavioural equality for CPSs. We recall that the only observable activities in CCPS are: time passing and channel communication. As a consequence, the capability to observe physical events (different from deadlocks) depends on the capability of the cyber components to recognise those events by acting on sensors and actuators, and then signalling them using (unrestricted) channels.
In a probabilistic setting, the definition of weak transition α = ⇒, which abstract away non-observable actions, is complicated by the fact that (strong) transitions take CPSs to distributions over CPSs. Following [15, 32] , we need to generalise transitions, so that they take sub-distributions to sub-distributions.
With an abuse of notation, we use γ and γ to range over sub-distributions over CPSs, under the assumption that ∑ M∈CCPS γ(M) ≤ 1.
For any CPS M and distribution γ, we write
such that M jα − → γ j for all j ∈ J, M iα − → , for all i ∈ I \ J, and γ = ∑ j∈J p j · γ j . Note that if α = τ then this definition entails that only some CPSs in the support of γ have anα − → transition. Then, we define the weak transition relationτ = ⇒ as the transitive and reflexive closure ofτ − →, i.e.τ = ⇒= (τ − →) * , while for α = τ we let
In order to define our probabilistic bisimulation, following [16] we rely on the notion of matching [44] (also known as coupling) for a pair of distributions. Intuitively, the matching for a pair (γ, γ ) may be understood as a transportation schedule for the shipment of probability mass from γ to γ .
We write Ω(γ, γ ) to denote the set of all matchings for (γ, γ ).
Everything is in place to define a notion of weak probabilistic bisimulation [3, 2] for CCPS. A main result of the paper is that our bisimilarity can be used to compare CPSs in a compositional manner. In particular, our bisimilarity is preserved by parallel composition of physically-disjoint CPSs, by parallel composition of pure-logical processes, and by channel restriction.
Intuitively, two CPSs are physically-disjoint if they have different plants but they may share logical channels for communication purposes. Thus, let
, then we define the disjoint union of the environments E 1 and E 2 , written E 1 E 2 , to be the environment ξ x , ξ u , ξ w , evol, ξ e , meas, inv such that:
Definition 9 (Physically-disjoint CPSs). Let M i = E i P i , for i ∈ {1, 2}. We say that M 1 and M 2 are physically-disjoint if E 1 and E 2 have disjoint sets of state variables, sensors and actuators. In this case, we write M 1 M 2 to denote the CPS defined as (E 1 E 2 ) (P 1 P 2 ). For any M ∈ CCPS, the special system Dead is physically-disjoint with M, and M Dead = Dead M = Dead.
Note that physically-disjoint CPSs may logically interact via shared communication channels.
A pure-logical process is a process which never accesses sensors and/or actuators. Basically, a pure-logical process is a TPL process [23] . Thus, in a system M Q, where M is an arbitrary CPS, a pure-logical process Q cannot interfere with the physical evolution of M. Although, process Q can definitely interact with M via communication channels, and hence affect its observable behaviour.
Definition 10 (Pure-logical processes). A process P is called pure-logical if it never acts on sensors and/or actuators. Now, everything is in place to prove the compositionality of our probabilistic bisimilarity ≈. As we will see in the next section, these compositional properties of our behavioural semantics will be very useful when reasoning on complex systems.
Case study
In this section, we provide a case study to illustrate how CCPS can be used to specify and reason on CPSs in a compositional manner. In particular, we model an engine whose temperature is maintained within a specific range by means of a cooling system. We remark that while we have kept the example as simple as possible, it is actually far from trivial.
As regards the physical environment we adopt discrete uniform distributions over suitable intervals to model both the evolution map and the measurement map. 3 In our model, we assume a granularity g ∈ N + representing the precision 10 −g of the model in estimating physical values. Thus, for an arbitrary real
Given a granularity g ∈ N + , the physical environment Env g of the engine is constituted by: (i) a state variable temp containing the current temperature of the engine; (ii) an actuator cool to turn on/off the cooling system; (iii) an uncertainty δ = 0.4 associated to the only variable temp; (iv) a simple evolution law evol that increases (resp. decreases) the value of temp, when the cooling system is inactive (resp. active), by a value determined according to a discrete distribution of probability, taking into account the uncertainty δ and granularity g, over reals; (v) a sensor s t (such as a thermometer or a thermocouple) measuring the temperature of the engine, with an error ε = 0.1; (vi) a measurement map meas returning the value detected by the sensor s t determined by a discrete probability distribution based on the error ε and the granularity g; (vii) an invariant function saying that the system gets faulty when the temperature of the engine gets out of the range [0, 30].
Formally, Env g = ξ x , ξ u , ξ w , evol, ξ e , meas, inv with:
for the sake of simplicity, we can assume ξ u to be a mapping
The cyber component of the engine consists of a process Ctrl which models the controller activity. Intuitively, process Ctrl senses the temperature of the engine at each time interval. When the sensed temperature is above 10, the controller activates the coolant. The cooling activity is maintained for 5 consecutive time units. After that time, if the temperature does not drop below 10 then the controller transmits its ID on a specific channel for signalling a warning, it keeps cooling for another 5 time units, and then checks again the sensed temperature; otherwise, if the sensed temperature is not above the threshold 10, the controller turns off the cooling and moves to the next time interval. Formally,
The whole engine is defined as: Eng g = Env g Ctrl , where Env g is the physical environment defined before.
Our operational semantics allows us to formally prove a number of run-time properties of our engine. For instance, the following proposition says that our engine never reaches a warning state and never deadlocks. Proposition 1. Let Eng g be the CPS defined before. Given any computation Eng g
Actually, we can be quite precise on the temperature reached by the engine before and after the cooling activity: in each of the 5 time slots of cooling, the temperature will drop of a value laying in the interval [1−δ , 1+δ ] g . Formally: • if M turns the cooling on then the value of the state variable temp in M ranges over (9.9, 11.5];
• if M turns the cooling off then the value of the variable temp in M ranges over (2.9, 8.5].
In Figure 2 , the left graphic collects a campaign of 100 simulations in MATLAB 4 , lasting 250 time units each, showing that the value of the state variable temp when the cooling system is turned on (resp., off) lays in the interval (9.9, 11.5] (resp., (2.9, 8.5]); these bounds are represented by the dashed horizontal lines. The right graphic shows three examples of possible evolutions in time of the state variable temp. Now, the reader may wonder whether it is possible to design a variant of our engine which meets the same specification with better performances. For instance, an engine consuming less coolant. Let us consider a variant of the engine described before:
Here, Env g is the same as Env g except for the evolution map, as we set
ξ u (cool) = on (active cooling). This means that in Eng g we reduce the power of the cooling system by 20%. In Figure 3 , we report the results of our simulations in MATLAB over 10000 runs lasting 10000 time units each. From this graph, Eng g saves in average more than 10% of coolant with respect to Eng g . So, the new question is: are these two engines behavioural equivalent? Do they meet the same specification?
Our bisimilarity provides us with a precise answer to these questions: the two variants of the engine are bisimilar. At this point, one may wonder whether it is possible to improve the performances of our engine even more. For instance, by reducing the power of the cooling system by a further 10%, by setting
We can formally prove that this is not possible.
Proposition 4. Let Eng g be the same as Eng g , except for the evolution map, in which the real interval
Then, Eng g ≈ Eng g , for any g ∈ N + .
Finally, we show how we can use the compositionality of our behavioural semantics (Theorem 2) to deal with bigger CPSs. Suppose that Eng g denotes the modelisation of an airplane engine. In this case, we could model a very simple airplane control system that checks whether the left engine (Eng L g ) and the right engine (Eng R g ) are signalling warnings. The whole CPS is defined as follows:
and process Check is defined as follows:
Intuitively, if one of the two engines is in a warning state then the process Check id i , for id ∈ {L, R}, checks whether also the second engine moves into a warning state, in the following 5 time intervals (i.e. during the cooling cycle). If both engines get in a warning state then an alarm is sent, otherwise, if only one engine is facing a warning then the airplane control system yields a failure signalling which engine is not working properly.
So, since we know that Eng g ≈ Eng g , for any g ∈ N + , the final question becomes the following:
can we safely equip our airplane with the more performant engines, We end this section with an observation. Although, the engine Eng g is not behavioural equivalent to the original engine Eng g , an airplane maker might be interested in knowing an estimation of the deviation of its behaviour with respect the behaviour of the original engine. If this deviation would be very small The rest of the paper is devoted to develop general quantitative techniques to estimate the deviation of the probabilistic behaviour of a CPS with respect to another.
Bisimulation metrics
In this section, we provide a weak behavioural distance to compare the probabilistic behaviour of CPSs up to a given approximation. To this end, we adapt the notion of weak bisimilarity metric [18] to CCPS. Intuitively, we will write M ≈ p N if the weak bisimilarity between M and N holds with a distance p, with p ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, ≈ 0 will coincide with the weak probabilistic bisimilarity of Definition 8, whereas ≈ 1 will correspond to the cartesian product CCPS × CCPS.
Weak bisimilarity metric is defined as a pseudometric measuring the tolerance of the probabilistic weak bisimilarity.
Weak bisimilarity metric provides the quantitative analogous of the weak bisimulation game: two CPSs M and N at distance p can mimic each others transitions and evolve to distributions γ and γ , respectively, placed at some distance q, with q ≤ p. This requires to lift pseudometrics from CPSs to distributions over CPSs. To this end, as in [32] , we rely on the notions of matching [44] and Kantorovich lifting [25] . 5 In Definition 7, we already provided the definition of matching. Let us define the Kantorovich lifting. Note that since we are considering only distributions with finite support, the minimum over the set of matchings Ω(γ, γ ) is well defined.
Definition 13 (Weak bisimulation metric). We say that a pseudometric d :
Note that in the previous definition, if |γ |< 1 then, with probability 1− |γ |, there is no way to simulate the behaviour of any CPS with a valid invariant in the support of γ (the special CPS Dead does not perform any action).
A crucial result is the existence of the minimal weak bisimulation metric [18] , called weak bisimilarity metric, and denoted with d. We remark that in [18] it is shown that the kernel of d coincides with the definition of weak probabilistic bisimilarity. In the next section, we will use a more refined notion of distance that considers only the first n ∈ N computation steps, when comparing two CPSs.
Such definition requires the introduction of a complete lattice 
where min / 0 = 1 and max / 0 = 0.
Notice that Definition 15 and Definition 13 are strictly related as weak bisimulation metrics are pseudometrics that are prefixed points of B. Notice also that all max and min in Definition 15 are well defined since our pLTS is finitely branching.
Since K is monotone [37] it follows that B is a monotone function on ([0, 1] CCPS×CCPS , ). Furthermore, since this structure is a lattice, by Knaster-Tarski theorem it follows that B has a least prefixed point (which is also the least fixed point). Later we will show that this least prefixed point coincides with d. Now, we exploit the functional B to introduce a notion of n-weak bisimilarity metric, denoted d n , which intuitively quantifies the tolerance of the weak bisimulation in n steps. The idea is that d 0 coincides with the constant function 0 assigning distance 0 to all pairs of CPSs, whereas d n (M, N), for n > 0, is defined as d n (M, N) = B(d n−1 )(M, N). Thus, the n-weak bisimilarity metric between M and N is defined in terms of the (n−1)-weak bisimilarity metric between the distributions reached (in one step) by M and N, respectively. Definition 16 (n-weak bisimilarity metric). Let n ∈ N. The function B n (0), abbreviated as d n , is called n-weak bisimilarity metric.
Proposition 7. For all n ≥ 0, d n is a 1-bounded pseudometric.
Finally, we are ready to define our notion of n-distance between two CPSs.
Definition 17 (n-distance between CPSs). Let M, N ∈ CCPS and p ∈ [0, 1]. We say that M and N have n-distance p, written M ≈ n p N, if and only if d n (M, N) = p. Since our pLTS is finite branching, and hence image-finite, and all transitions lead to distributions with finite support, it is possible to prove that B is continuous [42] . Since B is also monotone, we can deduce that the closure ordinal of B is ω (see Section 3 of [42] ). As a consequence, the n-weak bisimilarity metrics converge to the weak bisimilarity metric when n grows indefinitely. Formally,
Last but but not least, the distances introduced in Definition 14 and Definition 17 allow us to compare CPSs in a compositional manner. In particular, these distances are preserved by parallel composition of physical-disjoint CPSs, by parallel composition of pure-logical processes, and by channel restriction. [17, 20, 21] .
In the next section, the compositional properties of Theorem 3 will be very useful when reasoning about non-trival CPSs.
Case study, reloaded
In Section 4, we proved that the original version of the proposed engine, Eng g , and its variant Eng g (saving up to 10% of coolant) are behavioural equivalent (i.e., bisimilar). Then, by relying on the compositionality of our probabilistic bisimilarity (Theorem 2), we proved that the two compound systems, Airplane g and Airplane g , mounting engines Eng g and Eng g , respectively, are bisimilar as well.
Actually, both results can be proved in terms of weak probabilistic metric with distance 0, as this specific metric coincides with the probabilistic bisimilarity (Proposition 6). Then, in Section 4 we moved our attention to a more performant engine, Eng g , saving almost 20% of coolant with respect to the original engine Eng g . In our behavioural analysis, we basically rejected this new variant as it may exhibit a different probabilistic behaviour when compared to Eng g . More precisely, the two systems Eng g and Eng g are not bisimilar (Proposition 5).
However, in many complex probabilistic systems, such as CPSs, probabilistic bisimilarity might reveal to be too strong as the natural behavioural equivalence to take systems apart. Thus, in Section 4 we advocated for some appropriate notion of behavioural distance to estimate the effective difference, in terms of behaviour, of these two versions of the engine.
In the current section, we apply the bisimulation metrics defined in Section 5 to estimate the distance between Eng g and Eng g , by varying the granularity g ∈ N + . In particular, we apply the notion of n-weak bisimilarity metric. 
Note that if the cooling system of Eng g is off and it is not going to be activated in the current time slot, then the sensed temperature is below than or equal to 10, and the real temperature is below than or equal to 10.1 degrees (we recall that ε = 0.1). Assume that the temperature is exactly 10.1. If in the current time slot the temperature increases of a value v ∈ (1.3, 1.4] then it will reach a value in the interval (11.4, 11.5] (we recall that δ = 0.4). This happens with a probability bounded by q g . In this case, the cooling system will be turned on, and the temperature will drop, in each of the following 5 time slots, of some value laying in the interval [0.7−δ , 0.7+δ ] = [0.3, 1.1]. However, if in each of those 5 slots of cooling the temperature is decreased of a value laying in [0.3, 0, 4), then the cooling activity might not be enough to avoid (observable) warnings, and the two engines Eng g and Eng g will be distinguished. Thus, p g is given by the number of possible "bad decreases", | [0.3, 0.4) g |, divided by the number of all possible decreases, | [0.3, 1.1] g |; whereas q g is given by the number of possible "bad increases", | (1.3, 1.4] g |, divided by the number of all possible increases | [0.6, 1.4] g |.
Notice that p g and q g refer to real intervals which are basically shifted. Thus, we have that | [0.3, 0.4) g | = | (1.3, 1.4] g | = 10 g−1 and | [0.3, 1.1] g | = | [0.6, 1.4] g | = 8 · 10 g−1 + 1. As a consequence, p g = q g = 10 g−1 8·10 g−1 +1 = 1 8+10 −g+1 . Obviously, the finer is the granularity g the closer is the value of p g and q g to 1 8 . Formally, lim
Thus, for instance, assuming a granularity g = 6, after n = 3000 computation steps the distance between the two systems is less than 0.012. By an easy inspection in the (common) logics of the two engines, it is easy to see that any two subsequent idle-actions are separated by at most 2 untimed actions. Thus, 3000 computation steps means around 1000 time slots. Considering time slots lasting 20 seconds each, this means more then five hours. Thus, an utilisation of Eng g might be feasible in airplanes used for short-range flights, where the engine is actually used for a limited amount of time. Actually, aeronautical engineers might consider perfectly acceptable the risk of mounting the engine Eng g instead of Eng g , when compared to the reliability of the other components of the airplane.
However, since an airplane mounts two engines, engineers need to estimate the difference in terms of behaviour on the whole airplane resulting by the adoption of different versions of the engine. This is exactly the point where we can rely on Theorem 3 to support compositional reasoning.
The following result follows from Equation 1, Proposition 10 and Theorem 3.
Proposition 11. Let g ∈ N + and n ∈ N. Let Airplane g = Eng L g ( Eng R g Check \{warning} . Then, 1. d n (Airplane g , Airplane g ) ≤ 2p, where p = 1 − 1 − q g (p g ) 5 n 2. lim g→∞ d n (Airplane g , Airplane g ) ≤ 2 1 − 1 − 1 8 6 n .
Thus, for g = 6, after n = 3000 computation steps, the distance between the two airplanes mounting different engines is less than 0.024; a distance which may be considered still acceptable in specific contexts. Notice that in the (common) logics of the two airplanes, it is easy to see that two idle-actions are separated by at most 5 untimed actions (two for each engine plus one to signal a possible alarm). Thus, 3000 computation steps means around 600 time slots, i.e., more than three hours for time slots lasting 20 second each.
Finally, the reader should notice that the bound of the distance between the two airplanes is given by the summation of the bounds of the distances between the two corresponding engines. This is perfectly in line with the fact that our bisimulation metrics enjoy the non-expansiveness property.
Conclusions, related and future work
We have proposed a hybrid probabilistic process calculus, called CCPS, for specifying and reasoning on Cyber-Physical Systems. Our calculus allows us to specify a CPS as the composition of its physical plant, containing information on state variables, actuators, sensors, evolution law, etc., and its controller which represents the logics of the system. These two components interact through sensors and actuators, whereas interactions inside a controller or between controllers of different systems rely on channel-based communication. CCPS is a probabilistic calculus to model both the uncertainty of the physical model and measurement errors in sensor reading, by means of discrete probability distributions.
CCPS is equipped with a probabilistic labelled transition semantics which satisfies classical time properties: time determinism, patience, maximal progress, and well-timedness. As behavioural semantics we have adopted a natural notion of weak probabilistic bisimilarity which is proved to be preserved by appropriate system contexts that are suitable for compositional reasoning. Then, we argue that probabilistic bisimilarity is only partially satisfactory to reason on CPSs as it can only establish whether two CPSs behave exactly in the same way. To this end, we generalise our probabilistic bisimilarity by providing a notion of weak bisimulation metric along the lines of [18] . We considered also a notion of weak bisimulation metric in n steps, which reveals to be very effective whenever it is not necessary to observe the system "ad infinitum" but it is enough to observe its behaviour restricted to bounded computations. Again, both bisimulation metrics are proved to be suitable for compositional reasoning. The paper provides a non-trivial case study, taken from an engineering application, and use it to illustrate our definitions and our compositional probabilistic behavioural theory for CCPS.
A number of approaches have been proposed for modelling CPSs using formal methods. For instance, hybrid automata [1] combine finite state transition systems (to model the cyber component) and continuous variables and dynamic (to represent the physical component).
Hybrid process algebras [11, 5, 40] have been proposed for reasoning about physical systems and provide techniques for analysing and verifying protocols for hybrid automata. CCPS shares some similarities with the φ -calculus [38] , a hybrid extension of the π-calculus [35] . In the φ -calculus, a hybrid system is represented as a pair (E, P), where E is the environment and P is the process interacting with the environment. Unlike CCPS, in φ -calculus, given a system (E, P) the process P can dynamically change both the evolution law and the invariant of the system. However, the φ -calculus does not have a representation of physical devices and measurement law. Furthermore, the φ -calculus is equipped with a weak bisimilarity between systems that is not compositional.
Galpin et al. [19] proposed a process algebra, called HYPE, in which the continuous part of the system is represented by appropriate variables whose changes are determined by active influences (i.e., commands on actuators). The authors defines a strong bisimulation that extends the ic-bisimulation of [5] . Unlike ic-bisimulation, the bisimulation in HYPE is preserved by a notion of parallel composition that is slightly more permissive than ours. However, bisimilar systems in HYPE must always have the same influence. Thus, in HYPE we cannot compare CPSs sending different commands on actuators at the same time, as we do (for instance) in Proposition 3.
Vigo et al. [43] proposed a calculus for wireless-based cyber-physical systems endowed with a theory to study cryptographic primitives, together with explicit notions of communication failure and unwanted communication. The calculus does not provide any notion of behavioural equivalence. It also lacks a clear distinction between physical and logical components.
Lanese et al. [28] proposed an untimed calculus of mobile IoT devices interacting with the physical environment by means of sensors and actuators. The calculus does not allow any representation of the physical environment, but is equipped with an end-user bisimilarity in which end-users may provide values to sensors, check actuators, and observe the mobility of smart devices. End-user bisimilarity is not preserved by parallel composition. Compositionality is recovered by strengthening its discriminating power.
Lanotte and Merro [29] extended and generalised the work of [28] in a timed setting by providing a bisimulation-based semantic theory that is suitable for compositional reasoning. As in [28] , the physical environment is not represented.
Bodei et al. [7] have proposed a new untimed process calculus, IoT-LYSA, supporting a control flow analysis that safely approximates the abstract behaviour of IoT systems. Essentially, they track how data spread from sensors to the logics of the network, and how physical data are manipulated. Intra-node generative communications in IoT-LYSA are implemented through a shared storeà la Linda [22] . In this manner physical data are made available to software entities that analyse them and trigger the relevant actuators to perform the desired behaviour. The calculus adopt asynchronous multi-party communication among nodes taking care of node proximity (the topology is static). The dynamics of the calculus is given in terms of a reduction relation. No behavioural equivalences are defined.
Probabilistic bisimulation theory [33, 39, 3, 2] is a well-established theory to compare the behaviour of probabilistic processes. Recently, it became clear that this notion of behavioural equivalence may be too strong in certain probabilistic models: a tiny variation of the probabilities can make these systems behaviourally different without any further information, although, in practice, many systems are approximately behavioural equivalent. This led to several notions of behavioural distances. The most prominent of those notions is the bisimulation metric semantics [18, 17, 41, 13] . Recent works [21] have shown that bisimulation metrics are suitable for compositional reasonings, as the distance between two complex systems can be often derived in terms of the distance between their components.
As future work, we believe that our paper can lay and streamline theoretical foundations for the development of formal and automated tools to verify CPSs before their practical implementation. To that end, we will consider applying, possibly after proper enhancements, existing tools and frameworks for automated verification, such as Maude [36] , PRISM [27] , SMC UPPAAL [12] and Ariadne [4] , resorting to the development of a dedicated tool if existing ones prove not up to the task. Finally, in [31] , we are currently working on a nonprobabilistic version of CCPS extended with security features to provide a formal study of a variety of cyber-physical attacks targetting physical devices. Also in this case, the final goal is to develop formal and automated tools to analyse security properties of CPSs.
(e.g. [34] ) similar to ours. Thus, it is straightforward to rewrite the proofs of those results for our slight variant of TPL. Proposition 12 (Processes time properties [23, 34] ). Assume a process P. 
such that ε = next(E) = ε , π = Q and π = Q . By the property of time determinism for processes in Proposition 12 we infer that P idle −−− → Q and P idle −−− → Q imply Q ≡ Q , hence π ≡ π , which completes the proof. 
. All these transitions can be derived only by rule (Time), thus implying that π i = P i for all i ≥ 2 and P i α i − → P i+1 for all i ≥ 1. This contradicts the property of well-timedness for processes in Proposition 12.
A.2 Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Theorem 2 This is a special case of Theorem 3. In detail, consider Theorem 2.1. We have that 
A.3 Proofs of Section 4
In order to prove Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 we use the following lemma that formalises the invariant properties binding the state variable temp with the activity of the cooling system. Intuitively, when the cooling system is inactive then the value of the state variable temp lays in the interval [0, 11 + ε + δ ]. Furthermore, if the coolant is not active and the variable temp lays in the interval (10 + ε, 11 + ε + δ ] then the cooling will be turned on in the next time slot. Finally, if the cooling system is active then there is some k = 1 . . . 5 such that the system was activated k time units ago, it was kept active so far and the state variable temp lays in the real interval (10 − ε − k * (1+δ ), 11 + ε + δ − k * (1−δ )]. Lemma 1. Let Eng be the system defined in Section 4. Let
such that the traces t j contain no idle-actions, for any j ∈ 1 . . . n−1, and for any i ∈ 1 . . . n we have
Then, for any i ∈ 1 . . . n−1 we have the following: Proof. Let us denote with v i the values of the state variable temp in the systems M i , i.e., ξ i x (temp) = v i . Moreover we will say that the coolant is active (resp., is not active) in M i if ξ i u (cool) = on (resp., ξ i u (cool) = off). The proof is by mathematical induction on n, i.e., the number of idle-actions of our traces. The case base n = 1 follows directly from the definition of Eng g . Let prove the inductive case. We assume that the three statements holds for n − 1 and we prove that they also hold for n.
1. Let us assume that the cooling is not active in M n , then we prove that v n ∈ [0, 11 + ε + δ ].
We consider separately the cases in which the coolant is active or not in By inductive hypothesis v n−1 ∈ (10 − ε − k * (1 + δ ), 11 + ε + δ − k * (1 − δ )] for some k ∈ 1 . . . 5 such that the coolant is not active in M n−1−k and is active in M n−k , . . . , M n−1 .
The case k ∈ {1, . . . , 4} is not admissible. In fact if k ∈ {1, . . . , 4} then the coolant would be active for less than 5 idle-actions as we know that M n is inactive. Hence it must be k = 5. Since δ = 0.4, ε = 0.1 and k = 5, it holds that v n−1 ∈ (10 − 0. 2. Let us assume that the coolant is not active in M n and v n ∈ (10 + ε, 11 + ε + δ ], then we prove that the coolant is active in M n+1 . Since the coolant is not active in M n then it will check the temperature before the next time slot. Since v n ∈ (10 + ε, 11 + ε + δ ] and ε = 0.1, then the process Ctrl will sense a temperature greater than 10 and the coolant will be turned on. Thus the coolant will be active in M n+1 . 3. Let us assume that the coolant is active in M n , then we prove that v n ∈ (10 − ε − k * (1 + δ ), 11 + ε + δ − k * (1 − δ )] for some k ∈ 1 . . . 5 and the coolant is not active in M n−k and active in M n−k+1 , . . . , M n . We separate the case in which the coolant is active in M n−1 from that in which is not active.
• Suppose the coolant is not active in M n−1 (and active in M n ). In this case k = 1 as the coolant is not active in M n−1 and it is active in M n . Since k = 1, we have to prove v n ∈ (10 − ε − (1 + δ ),
However, since the coolant is not active in M n−1 and is active in M n it means that the coolant has been switched on in M n−1 because the sensed temperature was above 10 (this may happen only if v n−1 > 10 − ε). By inductive hypothesis, since the coolant is not active in M n−1 , we have that v n−1 ∈ [0, 11 + ε + δ ]. Therefore, from v n−1 > 10 − ε and v n−1 ∈ [0, 11 + ε + δ ] it follows that v n−1 ∈ (10 − ε, 11 + ε + δ ]. Furthermore, since the coolant is active in M n , the temperature will decrease of a value in [1 − δ , 1 + δ ] g and therefore v n ∈ (10 − ε − (1 + δ ), 11 + ε + δ − (1 − δ )] which concludes this case of the proof. ]. Furthermore, since the coolant is already active since 5 idle actions, the controller of M n−1 is supposed to check the temperature.
As v n−1 ∈ (2.8, 8.6] the coolant should be turned off. In contradiction with the the fact that the coolant is active in M n . Hence it must be h ∈ 1 . . . 4. Let us prove that for k = h + 1 we obtain our result. Namely we have to prove that, for k = h + 1, (i) v n ∈ (10 − ε − k * (1 + δ ), 11 + ε + δ − k * (1 − δ )], and (ii) the coolant is not active in M n−k and active in M n−k+1 , . . . , M n . Let us prove the statement (i). By inductive hypotheses, it holds that v n−1 ∈ (10 − ε − h *
Since the coolant is active in M n then the temperature will decrease Hence, v n ∈ (10 − ε − (h + 1)
Let us prove the statement (ii). By inductive hypothesis the coolant is inactive in M n−1−h and it is active in M n−h , . . . , M n−1 . Now, since the coolant is active in M n , for k = h + 1, we have that the coolant is not active in M n−k and is active in M n−k+1 , . . . , M n which concludes this case of the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1 By the first two items of Lemma 1 and since δ = 0.4 and ε = 0.1, we infer that the value of the state variable temp is always in the real interval [0, 11.5]. As a consequence, the invariant of the system is never violated and the system never deadlocks. Then, the last item of Lemma 1 ensures that after 5 idle-actions happening when the coolant is active, the state variable temp is always in the real interval (10 − 0.1 − 5 * 1.4, 11 + 0.1 + 0.4 − 5 * 0.6] = (2.9, 8.5]. Hence the process Ctrl will never transmit on the channel warning.
Proof of Proposition 2 Let us prove the two statements separately.
• If process Ctrl senses a temperature above 10 (and hence Eng turns on the cooling) then the value of the state variable temp is greater than 10 − ε. By Lemma 1 the value of the state variable temp is always less or equal than 11 + ε + δ . Therefore, if Ctrl senses a temperature above 10, then the value of the state variable temp is in (10 − ε, 11 + ε + δ ].
• By Lemma 1 (third item) the coolant can be active for no more than 5 time slots. Hence, by Lemma 1, when Eng turns off the cooling system the state variable temp ranges over (10 − ε − 5 *
Proof of Proposition 3 The thesis follows directly by Proposition 9 and Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 4
It is is enough to prove that there exists an execution trace of the engine Eng g containing an output along channel warning. Then the result follows by an application of Proposition 1. We prove the thesis for g = 1. Indeed a trace of Eng g with g = 1 is a trace of Eng g with g ≥ g.
We can easily build up a trace for Eng g with g = 1 in which, after 10 idle-actions, in the 11-th time slot, the value of the state variable temp is 10.1. In fact, it is enough to increase the temperature of 1 degrees for the first 9 rounds and an increase of 1.1 degrees in the 10-th time slot. Notice that these are admissible values, since both 1 and 1.1 are in [1 − δ , 1 + δ ] g = [0.6, 1.4] g with g = 1. Being 10.1 the value of the state variable temp, there is an execution trace in which the sensed temperature is 10 (recall that ε = 0.1 and −0.1 ∈ [−0.1, 0.1] g with g = 1) and hence the cooling system is not activated. However, in the following time slot, i.e. the 12-th time slot, the temperature may reach the value 10.1 + 1 + δ = 11.5, imposing the activation of the cooling system. After 5 time units of cooling, in the 17-th time slot, the variable temp could be 11.5 − 5 * (0.7 − δ ) = 11.5 − 1.5 = 10. The sensed temperature would be in the real interval [9.9, 10.1] g with g = 1. Thus, there is an execution trace in which the sensed temperature is 10.1. As a consequence, the warning will be emitted, in the 17-th time slot.
Proof of Proposition 5 The thesis follows directly by Proposition 9 and Proposition 6
A.4 Proofs of Section 5
To prove that all d n are 1-bounded pseudometrics (Proposition 7), we need some preliminary result. First we show that the Kantorovich functional K maps pseudometrics to pseudometrics. To prove the triangle inequality K(d)(γ 1 , γ 2 ) ≤ K(d)(γ 1 , γ 3 )+K(d)(γ 3 , γ 2 ) for all γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 ∈ D(CCPS), first we consider the function ω :
, where the function ω 1 ∈ Ω(γ 1 , γ 3 ) is one of the optimal matchings realizing K(d)(γ 1 , γ 3 ) and ω 2 ∈ Ω(γ 3 , γ 2 ) one of the optimal matchings realizing K(d)(γ 3 , γ 2 ). Then, we prove that (i) ω is a matching in Ω(γ 1 , γ 2 ), and (ii)
and we observe that the proof that the right marginal of ω is γ 2 is analogous. Then, we show (ii) by
where the inequality follows from the triangular property of d and the third last equality follows by ω 2 ∈ Ω(γ 3 , γ 2 ) and ω 1 ∈ Ω(γ 1 , γ 2 ). N) . The sub-distributions ρ M and ρ N are of the form ρ M = ∑ i∈I p i · M i and ρ N = ∑ j∈J q j · N j . We have two subcases: The first is β 1 = τ and β 2 = α, the other β 1 = α and β 2 = τ.
We consider the case β 1 = τ and β 2 = α, the other is analogous. In this case we have |ρ M |=|ρ N |= 1 = ⇒ γ N with γ N = ∑ j∈J 1 q j · γ j . Since we had Nβ 1 = ⇒ ρ N , we can conclude Nα = ⇒ γ N . In the following we prove that the transitions N jβ 2 = ⇒ γ j can be chosen so that N) , which concludes the proof.
Let ω be one of the optimal matchings realizing K(d)(ρ M , ρ N ). We can rewrite the distributions ρ M and ρ N as ρ M = ∑ i∈I, j∈J ω(M i , N j ) · M i and ρ N = ∑ i∈I, j∈J ω(M i , N j ) · N j . For all i ∈ I 1 and j ∈ J, define γ i, j = γ i . We can rewrite γ M as γ M = ∑ i∈I 1 , j∈J ω(M i , N j ) · γ i, j . Analogously, for each j ∈ J 1 and i ∈ I we note that the transition q j N jβ
Then we note that for all i ∈ I 1 and j ∈ J 1 with d(M i , N j ) < 1, the transition N jβ 2 = ⇒ γ i, j can be chosen so that
For all i ∈ I 1 and j ∈ J 1 with d(M i , N j ) < 1, let ω i, j be one of the optimal matchings realizing K(d)(γ i, j , γ j + (1− |γ j |)Dead). Define ω : CCPS × CCPS → [0, 1] as the function such that
To infer the proof obligation
To show (i) we prove that the left marginal of ω is
Consider now the CPS Dead. In this case we have that ∑ N ∈CCPS ω (Dead, N ) equals the summation
To prove (ii), by looking at the definition of ω above we get that ∑ M ,N ∈CCPS ω (M , N ) · d(M , N ) is the summation of the following values: Dead) . By moving the first summand of the second, third and fourth items to the first item, we rewrite this summation as the summation of the following values: Dead) . By the definition of ω i, j the first item is ∑ i∈I 1 
Henceforth we are sure that in all cases the first item is less or equal ∑ i∈I 1 , j∈J 1 ω(M i , N j ) · d(M i , N j ). The second item is clearly less or equal than ∑ i∈I 1 , j∈J 2 ω(M i , N j ). The third item is 0, since d(Dead, N ) = 0 for all N ∈ CCPS. Finally, the last item is 0 since d(Dead, Dead) = 0. Namely,
is the summation of the following values: N) , as required.
We are now ready to prove that all d n are pseudometrics. Finally we prove the triangular property N) . By the inductive hypothesis and Proposition 13 we get that K(d n ) is a pseudometric, hence it satisfies the triangle inequality, namely
Proof of Proposition 8 Follows by the same arguments in [42] .
In order to prove the compositionality or our weak bisimilarity metrics, i.e. Theorem 3, we divide its statement in six different propositions. To prove that ≈ p preserves contextuality, we need a number of technical lemmas. Lemma 3 formalises a number of properties of the compound environment E 1 E 2 . Lemma 3. Let E 1 and E 2 be two physical environments. If defined, the environment E 1 E 2 has the following properties:
Proof. If M is the CPS Dead then also M O is Dead and the thesis is immediate. Consider the case M = Dead. Let us assume that M = E 1 P 1 and O = E 2 P 2 , for some environments E 1 and E 2 and processes P 1 and P 2 . We consider the case in which M α −− → γ is derived by rule (SensRead). The other cases where the transition is derived by the other rules in Table 2 can be proved in a similar manner. In this case, we have α = τ and there are a sensor s, probability values p i and real values v i with i ∈ I and a process P 1 such that the rule (SensRead) instances as −−−− → P 1 , by rule (Par) in Table 1 we can derive the transition
−−−− → P 1 P 2 , which is one of the premises of rule (SensRead) necessary to infer a transition by E 1 E 2 P 1 P 2 . Then, the premise inv(E 1 E 2 ) of (SensRead) follows by the validity of inv(E 1 ), the hypothesis inv(E 2 ) = true and Lemma 3 (6) . Finally, the premise read sensor(E 1 E 2 , s) = ∑ i∈I p i · v i follows by read sensor(E 1 , s) = ∑ i∈I p i · v i and Lemma 3(2). Therefore we have
Lemma 4 can be generalized to weak transitions. −→ for i ∈ I \ J and γ = ∑ j∈J p j · M j . We can prove now that for any j ∈ J we have M j O α 2 −→ γ j O. We distinguish two cases. The first case is
which completes the proof.
Next lemma says that the invariants of CPSs in distance < 1 must agree. Here comes one of the main technical result: the bisimilarity metric is preserved by the parallel composition of non-interfering CPSs. Table 2 .
• M O τ −− → γ is derived by rule (Tau) in Table 2 , instantiated as
• The transition M O idle −−− → γ is derived by rule (Time) in Table 2 , instantiated as
with γ = next(E) P .
• The transition M O cv −− → γ is derived by rule (Inp) in Table 2 , instantiated as
• The transition M O cv −− → γ is derived by rule (Out) in Table 2 .
We show only the first case, the other are analogous. We recall that, by definition of operator , the environments E 1 and E 2 have different physical devices. Thus, there are two cases:
• s is a sensor of E 1 . In this case, the transition P 1 P 2 s?(z) −−−− → P derives by rule (Par) in Table 1 from P 1 s?(z) −−−− → P 1 , where P 1 is a process such that P = P 1 P 2 . Moreover, the distribution γ can be written also as γ = γ (E 2 P 2 ) = γ O, for the distribution γ defined as γ = E 1 ∑ i∈I p i · P 1 { v i / z }.
First we argue that rule (SensRead) can be used to derive a transition by M. From inv(E 1 E 2 ) = true, by Lemma 3(2) we get both inv(E 1 ) = true and inv(E 2 ) = true. From read sensor(E 1 E 2 , s) = ∑ i∈I p i · v i , by Lemma 3(6) we derive read sensor(E 1 , s) = ∑ i∈I p i · v i . Summarizing, we have P 1 s?(z) −−−− → P 1 , inv(E 1 ) = true, and read sensor(E 1 , s) = ∑ i∈I p i · v i , which allows us to apply rule • s is a sensor of E 2 . In this case, the transition P 1 P 2 s?(z) −−−− → P derives by rule (Par) in Table 1 from P 2 s?(z) −−−− → P 2 , where P 2 is a process such that P = P 1 P 2 . Moreover, the distribution γ can be written also as γ = E 1 P 1 γ = M γ , for the distribution γ defined as γ = E 2 ∑ i∈I p i · P 2 { v i / z }.
We show that rule (SensRead) allow us to infer N O τ −− → N γ . Assume N = E 3 P 3 for some environment E 3 and process P 3 . By the rule (Par) we get P 3 P 2 s?(z) −−−− → P 3 P 2 . From inv(E 1 E 2 ) = true, by Lemma 3(2) we get both inv(E 1 ) = true and inv(E 2 ) = true. From d(M, N) < 1 and inv(E 1 ) = true, by Lemma 6 it follows that inv(E 3 ) = true. Then, inv(E 3 ) = true and inv(E 2 ) = true give, by Lemma 3(6), inv(E 3 E 2 ) = true. By Lemma 3(6), from read sensor(E 1 E 2 , s) = ∑ i∈I p i · v i we derive read sensor(E 2 , s) = ∑ i∈I p i · v i and from read sensor(E 2 , s) = ∑ i∈I p i · v i we derive read sensor(E 3 E 2 , s) = ∑ i∈I p i · v i . Summarising we have P 3 P 2 s?(z) −−−− → P 3 P 2 , inv(E 3 E 2 ) = true and read sensor(E 3 E 2 , s) = ∑ i∈I p i · v i . Hence, we can apply rule (SensRead) to infer N O τ −− → N γ . Finally, we can conclude that N γ is the distribution γ we were looking for by Proof. We proceed by induction over n. The base case n = 0 is immediate since d n (M, N) = 0(M, N) = 0 for all M, N ∈ CCPS. We consider the inductive step n + 1. The case d n+1 (M, N) = 1 is immediate, therefore we assume d n+1 (M, N) < 1. We have to show that any transition M O Finally, we prove that weak bisimilarity metrics are preserved by channel restriction. Proof. We reason as in Proposition 15. Hence, we proceed by induction over n, where the base case n = 0 is immediate and we consider the inductive step n + 1. The case d n+1 (M, N) = 1 is immediate, therefore we assume d n+1 (M, N) < 1. We have to show that any transition M\c 
A.5 Proofs of Section 6
Proof of Proposition 9 The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 10 and Proposition 11 (1) .
Proof of Proposition 10
Define the CPS NIL as NIL = E / 0 nil, where E / 0 is the empty environment. The only transition by NIL is NIL idle −−− → NIL. By Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 we infer that d n (Eng g , NIL) = 0. Therefore, by the triangular property of d n , to show the thesis d n (Eng g , Eng g ) ≤ 1 − 1 − q g (p g ) 5 n we can show d n (NIL, Eng g ) ≤ 1 − 1 − q g (p g ) 5 n .
The proof obligation d n (NIL, Eng g ) ≤ 1 − 1 − (p g ) 5 n follows from the following nine properties, by observing that the system Eng g satisfies the first one. In the following we denote the process recY. By Theorem 2(6) we obtain d n Airplane g , Airplane g ≤ 2p. Finally, from this fact a by Equation 1, we derive lim g→+∞ d n (Airplane g , Airplane g ) ≤ 2 1 − 1 − 1 8 6 n .
